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I. INTRODUCTION
The two mediations in the book Damages' illuminate much about mediation
in today's litigation environment--even though they took place in 1993 and each
was, in its own way, quite unusual. For that reason-and because we have few
* Copyright © Leonard L. Riskin 2004. C.A. Leedy Professor of Law and Isidor Loeb Professor
of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. B.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison;
J.D., New York University School of Law; LL.M., Yale Law School. I am grateful to Chris Guthrie
for encouraging me to take an interest in Damages and for collaborating with me in leading the first
MU School of Law course based on this book; to Donna Pavlick for preparing a timeline and in other
ways helping us plan and conduct that course; to Melody Daily for leading the course the second time
we offered it and for leading this project; and to my other wonderful colleagues for co-teaching this
course. I am especially grateful to four guests who provided much enlightenment at the live sympo-
sium "When Law, Medicine, and Insurance Collide," held at the University of Missouri-Columbia,
School of Law on April 11, 2003: Bill Doyle, Michael Koskoff, Tony Sabia, and Barry Werth; to the
students in both our Damages: A Case Study courses; and to the editors of the Journal of Dispute
Resolution, especially Editor in Chief Alyson Carrel, for coaxing this Symposium into print. Finally,
special thanks to the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for supporting and encouraging this pro-
ject. This Essay, part of a Symposium on teaching in law schools using BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES:
ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE (1998), is dedicated to the Sabia
family.
1. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE
(1998).
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good detailed descriptions of real mediations-I have used these two mediations
to teach in a variety of settings. First, they served as one of several focuses in the
course based on this book, called Damages: A Case Study, that we taught at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, School of Law in the winter 2002 and 2003
semesters. In that course, students did not have a uniform background in media-
tion; some knew a great deal and others knew just a little. Accordingly, I used
Werth's descriptions of these mediations as opportunities to teach about the basics
of mediation and its role in American tort law in order to give some insight into
advantages and disadvantages of various mediation and mediation advocacy be-
haviors. Second, I used these mediations in courses in mediation and alternative
dispute resolution at the University of Michigan Law School during the winter
2003 semester. In such settings, the students learned a great deal about mediation
before encountering these case studies. As a result, the analysis could be more
sophisticated and my presentation did not include much basic descriptive informa-
tion about mediation. This essay is based primarily on the materials I developed
for the Missouri courses. For that reason, it assumes the reader has very little
knowledge of mediation and, accordingly, includes some very basic information
about mediation that would be unnecessary in the other settings. It also assumes
that the reader is familiar with the Damages book. When I do not ask students to
read the entire book, I distribute a summary of the book and a list of characters,
which resemble materials that appear earlier in this symposium.
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II. BACKGROUND ON MEDIATION
In mediation, a third-party, seeking to be impartial, helps others resolve a dis-
pute or plan a transaction. Unlike a judge or arbitrator, a mediator has no author-
ity to impose a solution, so she helps the parties negotiate one. This means that
mediation, in contrast to a trial, normally is oriented more toward the future than
the past: the process need not produce a consensus about what has happened, but
it aspires to produce an agreement about what will happen. Since about 1980, the
use of mediation in connection with tort litigation (and other spheres) has grown
enormously in nearly every part of the United States. Today mediation is much
more common in virtually every part of the country than it was in 1993, when the
Sabia mediations took place. In many areas of the United States, mediation is part
of the routine practice of law. A major portion of the mediations, like those in
Damages, are voluntary, in the sense that the parties or their lawyers choose to
enter the process. But many courts order cases into mediation, either routinely or
in particular circumstances. The degree to which parties may select the mediator
varies from court to court. Courts may assign a particular mediator, subject to the
parties' approval, or require or encourage parties to select mediators from a court-
approved list of neutrals who have met specific criteria dealing with training, edu-
cation, and experience. Mediator compensation varies dramatically. In some
programs mediators serve pro-bono; in others they receive a fixed amount per
mediation or per hour or per day; in still other programs, and outside organized
programs, mediators set their own rates, which generally resemble lawyers' hourly
2. See Melody Richardson Daily et al., Using a Case Study to Teach Law, Lawyering, and Dispute
Resolution, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 1.
[Vol. I
Teaching and Learning
rates.3 A few mediators even use contingency fees, though some mediators think
this practice is unethical.
The mediation phase of the Sabia case began in September 1993, nine and a
half years after the birth of Little Tony and six and a half years after the filing of
Sabia v. Norwalk Hospital and Maryellen Humes in Bridgeport, Connecticut Su-
perior Court. It followed extensive pretrial discovery and settlement negotiations,
and included two quite different mediations.
III. THE FIRST MEDIATION5
I divide the discussion of the first mediation into four parts: deciding to medi-
ate; choosing the mediator; preparing for mediation; and mediating.
A. Deciding to Mediate
6
Plaintiffs' lawyers Michael Koskoff and Chris Bernard decided to propose
mediation after the judge postponed the long-delayed trial-just one day before it
was to begin in September 1993. Bernard was concerned about Tony Sabia's
emotional condition, and both Bernard and Koskoff worried that Little Tony
might die before the case was resolved. But they faced a common dilemma: if
they proposed mediation, the other side might take that as a sign of weakness. To
deal with that potential problem, in suggesting mediation, Bernard offered to let
Travelers select the mediator. He was aware that Travelers had been a leader
among insurance companies in promoting mediation of insurance claims, and so
he thought that resistance from Bill Doyle or Travelers would be a sign of weak-
ness on the defense side.7
B. Choosing the Mediator
David Ferguson was an unusual choice for mediator. He had a Masters De-
gree in Conflict Resolution from George Mason University in Virginia, an excel-
lent program, and apparently had experienced great success as a mediator. Re-
cently he had joined Endispute, a highly regarded dispute resolution firm, which
has subsequently merged with other providers. But he was not trained as a law-
yer. In 1993 and today, almost all mediations in tort cases involving insurance
claims (especially those that deal with significant amounts of money) are medi-
ated by lawyer-mediators. Court-connected mediation programs that maintain
rosters of mediators sometimes restrict membership to lawyers-a practice to
which many non-lawyer mediators object. Even in the absence of such restric-
tions, lawyers representing the parties generally select a lawyer as mediator.
3. For background on mediation, see JAMES ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY & PRACTICE
(2001); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 313-501
(2d ed. 1997).
4. See Scott Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing
Neutrality through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2003).
5. WERTH, supra note 1, at 296-99, 310-25.
6. Id. at 298-99.
7. Id. at 299.
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Some do so because they want the mediator to be able to fully understand their
claims and the relevant law, which may provide the "shadow" in which they will
negotiate;8 to make a prediction about what would happen in court; or, in otherways, to help them better understand their legal situations.
C. Preparing for Mediation
1. The Mediator
Werth tells us that Ferguson liked to know "next to nothing" about the case
before the mediation began,9 although he does not tell us exactly what information
the parties sent him, either at his request or on their own initiative. Mediators and
mediation programs have a wide range of practices as to such issues. These in-
clude:
Asking the lawyers to send the mediator short letters outlining their
claims, history of negotiations, and, sometimes, their clients' aspira-
tions (coupled with directions either to send, or not send copies to
opposing counsel-or to decide this question for themselves). I al-
ways ask the lawyers also to discuss their clients' underlying inter-
ests, i.e., what really motivates them in asserting positions; the law-
yers rarely do so.
" Asking for a mediation brief or copies of all relevant pleadings,
depositions, and other materials, which the mediator can study be-
fore the mediation-for which the mediator ordinarily would charge
her regular hourly rate.
* Conducting a pre-mediation meeting or telephone conference call to
learn about the case and to discuss and perhaps make decisions about
procedural issues. Such sessions usually take place well in advance
of the mediation.
" Conducting private caucuses with each side before the first joint ses-
sion.
The book does not tell us which, if any, of these steps took place.
2. The Parties and Lawyers
When Koskoff briefed Tony and Donna Sabia about their case in preparation
for this mediation, he stressed the rationale for their claim-in Werth's terms, that
"they and their [family] had been devastated by appalling medical care."'
8. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
9. WERTH, supra note 1, at 313.
10. Id. at 311.
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Koskoff also recommended how they should treat various settlement offers: "' [I]f
the offer was less than $5 million, I'd recommend that they reject it; that between
$5 million and $7 million was a judgment call; and that anything over $7.5 million
they ought to take.""'1
It is not clear from the book what else Koskoff and Bernard did to prepare
Donna and Tony for the first mediation. Tom Arnold, a well-known mediator of
intellectual property and other complex disputes, argues that it usually is valuable
for the lawyer to explain the mediation process to the client; to prepare the client
to make a statement; and to arrange for the client to be present during all or part of
the mediation. 12 My previous discussion of the ways a client can be available
during a settlement conference and the potential advantages and disadvantages of
a client's presence at such conferences applies equally to mediation:
A client's attendance at a settlement conference can take numerous
forms. The following continuum describes one aspect of such involve-
ment:
" Client is available by telephone.
" Client waits outside the conference room.
" Client waits outside the conference room part of the time
and sits in on the conference part of the time.
" Client sits in on the conference but does not speak, except
to perhaps his lawyer.
" Client sits in on the conference and speaks in response to
questions from his lawyer or in response to questions from
the other lawyer or judge.
* Client sits in on the conference and speaks and asks ques-
tions relatively freely.
" Client takes lead in speaking, consults lawyer as needed.
" Client and lawyer meet privately with judge.
" Client meets with judge without lawyers.
1. Id. at 312.
12. Tom Amold, 20 Most Common Errors in Mediation Advocacy, 13 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST
LITIG. 69 (1995).
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One area of debate concerns the effect of the client's participation on the
client's own interests. For each potential advantage trumpeted, a corre-
sponding risk or potential disadvantage waits to be sounded:
" The client's presence increases the likelihood that her law-
yer will be well prepared. [But: the client's presence may
incline some lawyers to posture, to "show off." In addition,
the client may become a great bother, interfering with the
lawyer's ability to accomplish her work.]
" The client's presence can reduce the risk that interests of
the lawyer will prevail over those of the client. For in-
stance, a lawyer might recommend for or against a particu-
lar settlement because of the lawyer's own financial or pro-
fessional needs, which could be related to excessive pres-
sure from the judge. [But: the client's presence may re-
move tactical advantages. For example, often a lawyer will
falsely attribute stubbornness to the client to give the law-
yer negotiating strength. In addition, it may be strategically
useful to delay consideration of an offer from the other side;
this is easier to do with an absent client.]
The client will feel he has had a chance to tell his story, in
his own words, by participating in a settlement conference.
[But: to the extent that such a feeling makes it easier for
the client to settle, he loses his real day in court.]
The client can learn much about the strengths and weak-
nesses of both sides of the case by observing the conduct of
the other parties, the lawyers, and the judge; this can soften
his attitude or positions. [But: exposure to the other side's
behavior will anger or harden some clients, making settle-
ment more difficult.]
" If the client actually observes the exchange of monetary of-
fers, he can better assess the strength of the other side's
commitment to a position; he may notice things the lawyer
misses. Although there may be some lawyers who can fully
appreciate and convey the nuances of a settlement negotia-
tion, many are vulnerable to misreading, to oversimplifying,
and to embracing too warmly the virtues of their own side's
case. [But: the client may misinterpret the events and af-
fect the lawyer's judgment in an erroneous direction or be-
come more difficult to "control."]
" The client's presence permits more rounds of offers and
counter-offers. It permits him to act on new information
[Vol. I
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and allows cooperation and momentum to build. In addi-
tion, attendance requires the client to pay attention to the
case, which, in itself, makes settlement more likely. [But:
the client may lose his resolve because of the "crucible ef-
fect."]
" The client can clear up miscommunications about facts and
interests between lawyers. [But: the client may be too
emotionally involved to see the facts clearly.]
" Direct communication between clients can lead to better
understanding of each other or of the events that transpired,
perhaps even allow a healing of the rift between them.
[But: direct communication may cause a flare-up and loss
of objectivity. Parties may harden their resolve.]
" The client, because he is more familiar with his situation
may be more able to spot opportunities for problem-solving
solutions, which could lead to quicker and more satisfying
agreements. [But: the client may give away information
about his underlying interests that could leave him vulner-
able to exploitation. Moreover, the client will not be suffi-
ciently objective. A lawyer knowledgeable about the cli-
ent's situation might do a better job of developing problem-
solving solutions.]
" Because the client's presence increases the likelihood of a
settlement, and a settlement that will be satisfactory to the
client, participation likely will result in a savings of time
and money for the client. [But: if some of the risks de-
scribed above materialize, his presence will have caused
him to lose time and money.]
13
D. Mediating
I recently described a method of understanding decision-making in and about
a mediation, which I call the "New New Grid System."'14 It divides decision-
making into three types-substantive, procedural, and meta-procedural. Substan-
tive decision-making deals with defining the problem or problems to address in
the mediation and with trying to understand and resolve them. Procedural deci-
sion-making deals with establishing procedures, including logistics, and the roles
of the mediator and the participants. Meta-procedural decision-making means
13. Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1098-1102 (1991) [hereinafter
Riskin, Represented Client].
14. Leonard L. Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 34-51 (2003) [hereinafter Riskin, New New Grid].
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deciding how to make subsequent procedural decisions. The New New Grid Sys-
tem provides a graphic method of depicting the influence that any participant-
parties, lawyers, mediators--expect or hope to exert, or actually exert, with re-
spect to any number of issues-substantive, procedural, or meta-procedural.
For purposes of this essay, I will focus on only a small number of issues that
seem to hold the most educational benefits, including: (1) the substantive decision
of what should be the problem-definition or focus of the mediation; (2) the related
procedural issue of whether and how the clients should participate in the media-
tion; and (3) the procedural issue of whether the mediator should evaluate, i.e.,
make predictions about what would happen in court. Damages provides almost
no information about meta-procedural decision-making. This is not surprising, as
such decision-making often is implicit and outside the conscious awareness of the
participants. Accordingly, in this essay, I will ignore meta-procedural decision-
making.
1. Problem-Definition
The problem or problems to be addressed in this mediation could have been
defined in a variety of ways, ranging from narrow to broad (with the broad typi-
cally including the narrow). I have previously used the following graphic, Figure
1, to depict the issue of problem-definition.
15
B
N R
A IV.
R Litigation Business Personal/Professional/ Community O
R Issues Interests Relational Interests Interests
0
W A
FIGURE 1. PROBLEM-DEFINITION CONTINUUM
Copyright © 2003 Leonard L. Riskin
Using this figure in connection with the Sabia case, at the narrowest point, the
"problem" is how much money Travelers will pay the Sabias. In this conception
of the problem, the most important information is what is likely to happen if this
case goes to trial and the likelihood that Little Tony's death might occur before
the trial, which would have drastically reduced the amount of potentially recover-
able damages. This idea of the problem takes into account almost exclusively the
15. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid
for the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 22 (1996) [hereinafter Riskin, Mediators' Orientations].
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financial value of the Sabias' legal claims and each side's willingness to face the
risks of not settling.
Broader definitions of the problem include the parties' underlying interests or
needs that motivate them to assert their positions. In this case, as we will see be-
low, Tony and Donna's needs might have included understanding what actually
caused the damage to their children; gaining recognition or acknowledgement of
how they suffered and how well they had coped (what Robert A. Baruch Bush and
Joseph Folger have called "recognition"); 16 providing care for Little Tony over his
lifetime; and, perhaps, at least in the opinion of one of the defense lawyers, ena-
bling their other children to attend college. 17 A still broader definition could have
included needs of a wider segment of the community. It is conceivable, for in-
stance, that in the mediation setting, the parties could have turned their attention to
improving public or private assistance programs, which might have helped this
family and other families in similar situations.1
8
Many commentators, myself included, trumpet mediation's potential for fos-
tering broad problem-definitions that allow for creative problem-solving, for heal-
ing relationships, and for transforming people and situations. 19 Yet in this case (as
is true in the vast bulk of mediations involving personal injury claims), the nar-
rowest definition of the problem seemed to govern. Indeed, there is no suggestion
in this book that any professional involved in this mediation did anything to
broaden the problem-definition 20---except for Doyle's initial offer, described
above, which sought to build on what he assumed, without asking, were the
Sabias' needs. Who chose this narrow definition, how, and why?
It seems that many factors might have contributed to this narrowness. First,
pretrial litigation processes routinely rest on a narrow problem-definition. Sec-
ond, apparently all the lawyers fully subscribed to that narrowness, the product not
only of the circumstances, but also of a common mindset that I have labeled the
"lawyer's standard philosophical map":
16. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO
CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 84-99 (1994).
17. Who should define the problems to be addressed? Here, Bill Doyle, attorney for the hospital
(hired by the hospital's insurance company, Travelers) apparently thought he knew the Sabias' needs.
Did he? This conception of the problem was the basis for the first offer that Doyle extended in the
mediation. This offer was a structured settlement of $1.7 million, with an initial payment of $700,000
and $100,000 invested in annuities that would yield $60,000 per year for Little Tony's lifetime. In
addition, Travelers offered to pay $12,500 each year for four years of college tuition for the Sabias'
other two children (not realizing that they had three). Id. at 318. Note that with the addition of this
tuition component (which would cost Travelers about $100,000), the offer would actually total $1.8
million, rather than the $1.7 million that Werth mentions.
18. Hints of such issues came out when Tony "exploded" upon learning that the defense had rejected
the mediator's $7 million settlement proposal. WERTH, supra note I, at 319. See also infra Part IV.
(discussing this issue in the context of the second mediation).
19. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16; Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 29, 44-45 (1982) [hereinafter Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers].
20. Although Damages seems an accurate depiction of the events that occurred, many of the state-
ments of fact are Werth's interpretations, based on interviews with people directly involved in the case.
While Werth is a gifted and careful reporter, inevitably, a study such as this cannot accurately report
every detail and nuance. We need to keep this limitation in mind as we try to understand, assess, and
learn from the conduct of the various participants.
2004]
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What appears on the map is determined largely by the power of two as-
sumptions about matters that lawyers handle: (1) that disputants are ad-
versaries-i.e., if one wins, the other must lose; and (2) that disputes may
be resolved through application, by a third party, of some general rule of
law ....
On the lawyer's standard philosophical map ... the client's situation is
seen atomistically; many links are not printed. The duty to represent the
client zealously within the bounds of the law discourages concern with
both the opponent's situation and the overall social effect of a given re-
sult.
Moreover, on the lawyer's standard philosophical map, quantities are
bright and large, while qualities appear dimly or not at all. When one
party wins, in this vision, usually the other party loses, and, most often,
the victory is reduced to a money judgment. This "reduction" of nonma-
terial values-such as honor, respect, dignity, security, and love-to
amounts of money, can have one of two effects. In some cases, these
values are excluded from the decision-maker's considerations, and thus
from the consciousness of the lawyers, as irrelevant. In others, they are
present but transmuted into something else-a justification for money
damages ....
The lawyer's standard world view is based upon a cognitive and ra-
tional outlook. Lawyers are trained to put people and events into catego-
ries that are legally meaningful, to think in terms of rights and duties es-
tablished by rules, to focus on acts more than persons. This view re-
quires a strong development of cognitive capabilities, which is often at-
tended by the under-cultivation of emotional faculties.2 I
Mediator David Ferguson apparently shared the lawyers' narrow conceptuali-
zation of the problem. There is no suggestion in the book that he did anything to
address Donna and Tony's interests in recognition. I have argued elsewhere that a
large percentage of mediators have a tendency toward defining the problem either
21. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra note 19, at 43-45. Of course this map is overdrawn; it
exaggerates a common tendency. Many lawyers practice in more balanced ways. And transactional
lawyers tend more often to draw on wider perspectives. But as I said almost twenty years ago, it
describes the way most lawyers think most of the time. Id. at 46. Other limiting mind-sets also con-
tribute to the problems 1 describe. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 9-91 (2000) (describing limiting mind-sets
associated with client counseling and negotiation).
This lawyer's standard philosophical map has its virtues, of course, but it also carries problems.
It severely limits a lawyer's ability to see things broadly or deeply, to develop curiosity, to listen fully
to clients and others, to learn about people's underlying interests, and to think creatively. And it seems
to render irrelevant attempts at self-understanding or at seeking out, or even noticing, what connects
people (in addition to what separates them). Thus, it may contribute to many problems in law practice
and in the legal system-such as excessive adversarialism, inadequate solutions, high costs, delays,
and dissatisfaction among both lawyers and clients-all of which produce suffering. Riskin, Media-
tion and Lawyers, supra note 19.
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broadly or narrowly.22 Many mediators who regularly handle personal injury
claims routinely adopt the narrow conceptualization that ordinarily has dominated
the pretrial and negotiation processes. Often this is what the lawyers expect. On
the other hand, many mediators who tend toward a broad focus customarily invite
the parties to consider broadening the focus to include their underlying interests.
It seems plain that Tony and Donna would have preferred a broader focus.
They wanted to learn what actually caused the damage to their children; to have
others recognize how they had suffered and how well they had coped; and to pro-
vide care for Little Tony over his lifetime.23 But they seemed to have little or no
influence over the development of the actual problem-definition. Although it is a
bit speculative, Figure 2 depicts the most likely predispositions or aspirations of
the various participants as to the problem-definition.
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
Problem
Definition
NARROW
Problem
Definition
BROAD
B
PARTY/LAWYER
INFLUENCE
FIGURE 2. SUBSTANTIVE DECISION-MAKING:
PREDISPOSITION/ASPIRATiONS RE: PROBLEM-DEFINITION
Copyright © 2003 Leonard L. Riskin
Point A shows that the plaintiffs' lawyers (PL), defense lawyers (DL), and media-
tor (M), all had a narrow conception of the problem-definition and assumed that
each would equally influence the development of that problem-definition. My
hunch is that they never actually discussed what the problem-definition should be,
but each assumed that the question of how much money would change hands sim-
ply was the problem. Point B shows that the Sabias were predisposed to a broader
problem-definition. I suspect they believed that they should have some influence
in establishing such a problem-definition.
22. Riskin, Mediators' Orientations, supra note 15, at 24-26.
23. WERTH, supra note 1, at 312 (Donna); Id. at 359 (Tony).
M-
PL A
DL
Sabias4
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2. Roles of Participants
a. The Parties
Broadening the focus to include the issues that Tony and Donna cared about
probably would have required that they attend the mediation session, or at least
substantial portions of it.2 4 Some mediators routinely urge the lawyers to include
clients in mediation. In some court mediation programs, clients must attend. In
this case, however, Michael Koskoff did not want Tony to attend, for fear that he
might "lose it."'25 Donna, Tony, and Little Tony were introduced at the beginning
of the mediation, and Donna and Tony remained available and participated in
caucuses with their lawyers and with the mediator, but did not attend the joint
mediation sessions. In one caucus, Tony did erupt;26 in that and other sessions, he
was able to make clear that he was in charge of deciding what offer they would
accept and that he was having strongly negative emotional reactions.
b. The Lawyers
The lawyers' behavior was quite typical of mediations of personal injury
claims: extremely adversarial, exaggerated arguments by both sides, reluctantly-
made offers by each side that the other side considers outrageous, the resulting
wide, seemingly unbridgeable gulf between their positions-these are standard
features of nearly all mediations of this sort. They are part of a "negotiation
dance" that both sides apparently feel a need to conduct, and which is virtually
impossible to short-circuit with negotiators who are accustomed to this system. In
other words, this is an extension of the kind of negotiation that ordinarily precedes
the mediation.
c. The Mediator
If that is true, why have a mediation? Why can't skillful lawyers negotiate
settlements? Usually they can, and mediation normally takes place when the law-
yers have failed to negotiate a settlement or when they, or a court, expect them to
have difficulty reaching a settlement. Mediation can enhance the likelihood of a
settlement in several ways. Simply holding a mediation-whether the mediator
performs well or not--often is enough to bring about a settlement. Although most
civil claims result in settlements, the vast bulk of these take place only after the
parties have spent a good deal of time and money preparing for trial. A mediation
scheduled earlier in the process sometimes can precipitate a settlement simply
because it requires the decision-makers to take the time to focus on the case and to
negotiate. (Although sometimes participants may be unwilling to settle without
knowing more information.) Without or before mediation, negotiations to settle
such cases often take place on the telephone, and it is easy to end such calls. The
very circumstances of a mediation require that the lawyers take the time to listen
24. See Riskin, Represented Client, supra note 13, at 1059.
25. WERTH, supra note 1, at 313.
26. Id. at 319.
[Vol. I
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to each other and deliberate. And the mere presence of the mediator usually
prompts each side to be polite, which ordinarily enhances opportunities for settle-
ment. Equally important, a mediator inclined toward a broad problem-definition
can help the parties explore underlying interests, or even to "heal" wounds associ-
ated with the dispute.
In addition, a mediator can help the parties transcend the "negotiator's di-
lemma"-the tension between adversarial and problem-solving approaches 2 7-by
learning about interests that a participant might be unwilling to reveal to the other
side and then, without disclosing these interests, helping to build a resolution that
accommodates them. A mediator can help the parties develop, exchange, and
evaluate offers. A mediator can model appropriate behavior. A mediator can
propose solutions. She can help the parties understand their own and each other's
interests as well as their legal claims. And through persistence and relentless op-
timism, a mediator can keep the parties talking and keep alive the possibility of
settlement. Not all mediators do all these things. But all mediators do some of
them.
In examining this mediator's conduct, I will focus on just two issues: (1) The
decision that the mediator would not provide an evaluation; and (2) The decision
to conduct most of the mediation in private caucuses.
1) Evaluation by the Mediator
The most interesting aspect of Ferguson's service was that, because he was
not trained as a lawyer, he probably was unable to assess the strengths and weak-
nesses of the legal positions and legal arguments. From the book, we cannot tell
the extent to which he understood those arguments, or could engage in discussions
about them. (To be fair to Ferguson, his prior experience as a mediator might
have given him significant familiarity with the legal issues.) When Ferguson
characterized his approach in helping parties reach an agreement as "facilitative,"
he likely was referring to the evaluative-facilitative continuum of mediator ap-
proaches. 28 I have recently proposed reconceptualizing that continuum, using the
terms "directive" to "elicitive." 9 Most of Ferguson's problem-solving work fell
into the elicitive category, in the sense that he was trying to get the parties to put
forth their own arguments and their own proposals. He apparently did not gener-
ally react to such proposals. It also seems clear, however, that the lawyers needed
some help with respect to their demands and offers. In Werth's words, Koskoff
27. Adversarial approaches are grounded on the assumption that the parties must divide a fixed
resource, and adversarial strategies commonly involve withholding information about one's true inter-
ests, misleading the other side, and asserting "positions" based on claimed entitlements. Problem-
solving approaches, on the other hand, assume that by exploring underlying interests (the needs that
underlie the parties' positions), the negotiators can "expand the pie" before dividing it. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). The two approaches interfere with each other: a negotiator who is too
adversarial may lose opportunities to create value; and the problem-solver's need to reveal his true
interests renders him vulnerable to exploitation by an adversarial counterpart. This potential for inter-
ference gives rise to the so-called "negotiator's dilemma"-whether to be adversarial or problem-
solving at every moment in a negotiation. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 21.
28. See Riskin, Mediators' Orientations, supra note 15.
29. See Riskin, New New Grid, supra note 14, at 30-34.
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thought "he had no incentive not to posture" 30 because Ferguson "wasn't going to
push him to be realistic.",3 1 Indeed, Ferguson thought that the lawyers wanted him
"to tell them what the case was worth., 3 2 Was Ferguson "directive" about the
decision not to evaluate? Is that a useful question, given that the lawyers may
have or should have known about Ferguson's self-identified mediator approach?
The issue of whether, when, how, and why a mediator should evaluate has
been the subject of enormous controversy. 33 Many commentators argue that me-
diators should not offer evaluations, either because an evaluation could interfere
with party autonomy or because mediators rarely have sufficient understanding of
a case to make a valid prediction. Others have argued that mediators should pro-
vide an evaluation only if the parties ask for it and only as a last resort. In actual
practice, however, most mediators who regularly mediate tort cases provide some
kind of evaluative feedback. They can offer a variety of kinds of evaluations,
ranging from very directive to very elicitive. Here is a list, for example, of
evaluative activities by the mediator, grouped in terms of whether they are "direc-
tive," that is, meant to direct the parties toward a particular solution or a particular
understanding, or "elicitive," 34 meant to encourage the parties or their lawyers to
contribute information as to the likely court outcome:
Directive
" Pushes the parties to accept a particular solution
* Tells the parties how a court would decide this case
" Tells the parties a range of outcomes in court, perhaps at-
taching percentages of likelihood
" Tells parties the strengths and weaknesses of their cases
30. WERTH, supra note 1, at 315.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 320.
33. See Riskin, New New Grid, supra note 14, at 11-12. See also James J. Alfini et al., Evaluative
vs. Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919 (1997); Richard Birke, Evalua-
tion and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. DiSP. RESOL. 309 (2000); Gary L. Gill-Austem,
Faithful, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 343 (2000); Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and
Why-Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 41 (2000); Chris
Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Impediments to Facilitative
Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie, Philosophical
Map]; L. Randolph Lowrey, To Evaluate or Not to Evaluate: That Is Not the Question, 33 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 48 (2000); James Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Trouble-
some Questions and Tentative Proposals from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769
(1997); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible
Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949 (1997); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying
Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic
Regime, 2001 J. DiSp. RESOL. 371 (2000); Jeffrey Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberat-
ing ADR from Ideology, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 247 (2001); Symposium, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839
(1999); Symposium, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 245; Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empower-
ment-And of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501 (1997).
34. See Riskin, New New Grid, supra note 14, at 20.
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Elicitive
* Asks lawyers about the likelihood of winning in court
* Asks lawyers about strengths and weaknesses of each side's
case
The more training and experience the mediator has in relevant areas of law,
the better job the mediator can do with any of these activities, especially the direc-
tive ones.
Eventually, as a last resort, Ferguson did offer something in the nature of an
evaluation. He did not evaluate their legal prospects, however, but proposed a
figure, $7 million, which he thought each side "would have to think very hard
about., 35 He did this as a last resort. In fact, the idea was Koskoff s. 36 When the
book explains how Ferguson presented this idea to both sides, it does not say
whether he explicitly asked Doyle if he wanted such an evaluation. Accordingly,
we cannot tell how directively Ferguson behaved about this, but I assume Doyle
could have derailed this plan had he wanted to do so.
The result was an unhappy one. It caused Doyle to completely lose faith in
Ferguson as the mediator. He believed that the figure Ferguson proposed set a
value on the case that greatly exceeded what he would recommend paying. In
addition, it apparently contributed to much agonizing on the part of Tony and
Donna, who, understandably, had to struggle with whether to agree to the media-
tor's proposal. The events surrounding the evaluation illustrate a well-recognized
potential drawback of more conventional kinds of evaluations of court outcomes.
In the words of Arthur Chaykin, vice-president of the Sprint Corporation,
"[p]arties often feel an evaluation is what they want, until they get it."' 37 It is easy
for an evaluation to undermine at least one party's confidence in the mediator's
impartiality.
Given Ferguson's background and the fact that an expert assessment might
have facilitated a settlement, what, if anything, could he have done to get such
feedback for the parties? With hindsight, a number of practices that were not
common at the time of this mediation suggest themselves. The mediator might
have brought in an expert to provide an assessment, or he might have helped the
lawyers construct evaluations by employing a "decision-tree." 38
2) The Private Caucus
After the first joint session, most of the mediation took place in private cau-
cuses-the most common arrangement in the mediation of personal injury claims
and other "commercial" (i.e., non-family, non-community, non-criminal) disputes
in the United States. Proponents of the caucus argue that it has several advantages
35. WERTH, supra note 1, at 323.
36. Id.
37. See Arthur A. Chaykin, Selecting the Right Mediator, DIsP. RESOL. J., Sept. 1994, at 58.
38. See David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113
(1996).
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that make it virtually essential: it gives the parties an opportunity to reveal infor-
mation to the mediator that they would not be willing to share with the other side;
provides them a chance to bond with the mediator; and allows a calm, safe atmos-
phere for deliberation and testing ideas.
However, a significant minority of mediators of commercial cases never or
almost never caucus. (In family mediation, and in some community mediation
programs, this no-caucus approach is quite common.) Those who avoid the pri-
vate caucus do so for several reasons: they believe that it gets in the way of the
parties' developing an understanding of each other; wastes time; and impairs party
autonomy by giving the mediator too much power, e.g., deciding what informa-
tion to reveal, when, and how, while putting him in the awkward position of keep-
ing secrets.39
E. Discussion Questions about the First Mediation
1. Did it make sense for Koskoff to sweeten his proposal to mediate by al-
lowing Travelers to select the mediator? What would you need to know about the
nature of the mediation that would take place in order to make such an offer?
40
Would it matter whether you expected the mediator to make predictions about
what would happen in court or to push the parties toward a particular agreement or
toward agreement in general? What would be the importance of subject matter
expertise?
4
In my mind, the selection of a mediator could depend on many factors. To
simplify, however, it generally would make more sense for a lawyer to allow the
other side to select the mediator if the mediator was not expected to render an
opinion about what would happen in court. Conversely, if the lawyers wanted
such a prediction, it would be essential that they had equal confidence in the me-
diator and that the mediator had the expertise to make such a prediction.
Would there have been other ways for Koskoff to make a mediation proposal
without appearing weak? Good suggestions along these lines, including a simple
explanation of the potential benefits of mediation coupled with an assertion of
confidence in one's own case, appear in a very helpful article by mediator J. Mi-
chael Keating, Jr.42 Some courts or judges order civil cases into mediation, either
by category of case or in certain circumstances; such orders reduce or eliminate
this dilemma.
2. If you were representing plaintiffs in a case such as this, what qualities or
capabilities would you want in a mediator? Would your answer be different if you
represented the hospital? If Humes had not settled, and you represented her?
39. For an excellent demonstration of the Understanding-Based model of mediation, which avoids
private caucuses, see Videotape: Saving the Last Dance: Resolving Conflict through Understanding
(Reunion Productions 2001) (on file with the Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation) [hereinaf-
ter Saving the Last Dance].
40. See Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 15, at 47-48. As indicated below, this mediator
did not, and because of his background could not, make predictions about a court outcome.
41. Id. at 46-47.
42. See J. Michael Keating, Jr., Getting Reluctant Parties to Mediate: A Guide for Advocates, 13
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 9 (1995).
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3. As a mediator, which approach toward getting information in advance of
the mediation would you follow? Which approach would you want as a lawyer or
party? What variables would you consider in answering these questions? To
what extent should the various participants in a mediation-parties, lawyers, me-
diators-influence the determination of such issues?
4. In briefing Donna and Tony for the first mediation, was it a good idea for
Koskoff to encourage them to "believe" the factual and legal arguments that he
intended to make? Did it "pump them up" too much? (Recall that before that
time they were still not clear that anyone was really at fault; rather, Tony won-
dered why this had happened to him.) Was it a good idea for Koskoff to tell them
about the range of settlement offers and to proffer recommendations about how to
treat such offers? Did these statements encourage them to think that they would
likely get a substantial settlement offer? It is common for lawyers to try to keep
their clients' expectations low in order to make it more likely that they will be
pleased with an eventual settlement. Could Koskoff have had that in mind? If so,
had he misperceived how the defense would negotiate? Or did he want to instill
high aspirations in Donna and Tony so that they would be willing to decline lesser
offers, which could lead to a higher settlement?
5. Based on what you know of the Sabia case, as their lawyer, how would
you assess the potential advantages of participation by Donna and Tony in this
mediation? It is clear that they wanted to participate and that Michael Koskoff
wanted to keep Tony out; Koskoff thought that Tony's behavior was unpredict-
able and that, as a result, it might undermine his efforts on Tony and Donna's
behalf. Koskoff recently indicated that in retrospect he was less certain of the
wisdom of the decision to keep Tony and Donna out of the joint sessions, after he
introduced them to the mediator and the defense team.43 As indicated below, the
question of who participates, and how, can have a major impact on decision-
making about and in mediation.
6. Do you think Koskoff was aware of Tony and Donna's needs for recogni-
tion? What about Bernard, who had worked intimately with them for a long time?
If so, what kept them from trying to address these needs in the mediation? (There
are suggestions in the book that Bernard maintained a close relationship with the
Sabias, and this may have included attention to such needs.)
7. Why did Doyle (apparently) assume that Tony and Donna wanted money
to send their other children to college? Is that a result of treating them like hypo-
thetical people, rather than real ones? What kept him from asking Tony and
Donna, or their lawyers, about their actual interests?
8. Nothing in the book suggests that the mediator did anything to bring atten-
tion to the parties' underlying interests. Assuming that was the case, what kept
the mediator from doing so?
9. One cause for Koskoff's concern about Tony's presence was that Doyle
might deliberately provoke Tony. Did that seem like a realistic possibility? What
was the potential harm of an "explosion" by Tony? What were the potential bene-
fits?
43. Michael Koskoff, Remarks at the "When Law, Medicine, and Insurance Collide" roundtable
discussion at the University of Missouri-Columbia, School of Law (Apr. 11, 2003).
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Were there other ways to include Tony while minimizing the risk and maxi-
mizing the potential benefits? Tom Arnold, a well-known Houston lawyer who
mediates large intellectual property disputes, argues that the wise lawyer will pre-
pare his client to participate in the mediation generally; in addition, he will pre-
pare the client to make an opening statement.44 Should Koskoff have done that in
this case? If Ferguson had sent Tom Arnold's article to Koskoff in advance of the
mediation, might Koskoff have included Donna and Tony? I have written previ-
ously that some mediators and some lawyers may exclude clients and other non-
lawyer participants from mediation sessions because of the unpredictability of
their behavior. The professionals may feel anxious, or at least uncomfortable, in
dealing with non-professionals.45 Given Tony's explosive temperament, do you
suppose that either the mediator or the defense lawyers wanted him in the media-
tion sessions? By asking these questions, I am not trying to second guess the
lawyers, but simply to identify issues and options.
10. Each side had a substantial delegation of professionals. The defense had
William Doyle and Beverly Hunt, the lawyers; Brian Casey, Travelers' Vice
President for Medical Liability; and Cathy Gonzales, Travelers' case manager,
facing three plaintiffs' lawyers, Michael Koskoff, Joel Lichtenstein, and Chris
Bernard. But should other individuals have participated? Given Donna and
Tony's needs for recognition, if they had been present for some of the sessions,
would it have made sense to include a representative of the hospital? What about
individuals who provided birth-related services to Donna, such as Barbara
McManamy or Molly Fortuna? Might participation in such a process have been
of value to them? Were they in any sense "damaged" by the entire dispute resolu-
tion process in this case? What risks would their presence have presented, and to
whom? And what about Humes? The case against her had already been settled, at
the insistence of her insurance carrier. But she carried many wounds-emotional
as well as financial. Might she and the Sabias have benefited from a direct con-
versation, especially given that the Sabias had substantial doubts that Humes was
at fault? What would have been the potential benefits and risks of including her in
some or all of the mediation sessions? What kind of change in mindsets would
have been required to make this happen?
11. Would the parties have been better off with a mediator who had a
stronger background in law? Apparently they thought so, as they selected media-
tors for the second mediation who had extensive legal experience in such matters.
Why, then, did they choose Ferguson in the first instance? Travelers selected him,
and Koskoff had previously been in mediation with him. So both sides had the
opportunity to know his background and what he could offer. If Koskoff did not
want Ferguson, he may have been unwilling to say so, given that he had offered to
let Travelers select the mediator. Is it possible that Travelers wanted Ferguson
precisely because they knew he would not offer an evaluation? 46 Is it possible that
one or both sides did not quite realize that Ferguson would not evaluate? Could it
44. Arnold, supra note 12, at 69.
45. See Riskin, Represented Client, supra note 13, at 1105.
46. Large insurance companies such as Travelers often have continuing relationships with organiza-
tions that provide mediation services for cases in which they are parties. Often the insurance compa-
nies will routinely offer to pay the mediation fees if the plaintiffs will agree to mediate. In this case, of
course, Koskoff proposed the mediation. See WERTH, supra note 1, at 298-99.
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be that, before the mediation, one or both sides thought they did not want an
evaluation, but changed their minds during the session?
12. How was the decision made that the mediator would not evaluate? Does
the following grid help you understand that issue?
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
Mediator Mediator
Behavior Behavior
EVALUATE NOT EVALUATE
PARTY/LAWYER
INFLUENCE
FIGURE 3. PROCEDURAL DECISION-MAKING:
INFLUENCE ON EVALUATION BY MEDIATOR
Copyright © 2003 Leonard L. Riskin
Was it a good idea for Ferguson to have proposed the $7 million figure? If he
had proposed $5 million, would that have angered Koskoff?
13. How do you think the mediator and parties decided to have private cau-
cuses, and when to have them? Does the directive/elicitive role of the mediator
continuum help us understand this question? A better way to understand it is
through the New New Grid System, which focuses on the influence that each par-
ticipant exerted, or might have exerted, over that issue, as shown in Figure 4.
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
ALL
CAUCUS
. 1 . I III. IV . NO
Heavy Semi- Moderate Light .,mULUo
Heavy
PARTY/LAWYER
INFLUENCE
FIGURE 4. PROCEDURAL DECISION-MAKING:
INFLUENCE ON USE OF CAUCUS
Copyright © 2003 Leonard L. Riskin
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It seems likely that in this case, there was no explicit decision-making around the
question of whether and to what extent caucuses would be used. In all likelihood
both the lawyers and the mediator assumed that they would use the caucus heav-
ily. It also is unlikely that the clients participated in decision-making around the
use of the caucus. Should they have done so?
IV. THE SECOND MEDIATION47
A. Deciding to Mediate and Choosing the Mediators
Doyle proposed the second mediation, and he suggested that the mediators be
lawyers who could, in Werth's words, "tell them what the case was really worth
and how a jury would most likely decide.,A8 Although co-mediation is common
in certain kinds of cases (e.g., high-stakes, very complex, multiparty commercial
or public policy disputes, and divorce and community mediation), it is rare in
medical malpractice cases. Doyle apparently reasoned (or so Koskoff thought)
that he would need the support of two "heavy hitters" in order to give Travelers
justification for raising its offer. (Plainly he never got the kind of justification he
sought in the first mediation.) He also must have thought that he needed the me-
diators to influence Koskoff.
Koskoff apparently agreed with Doyle's proposal that each side would choose
one mediator. In fact, each chose a mediator whom they trusted and who be-
longed to his opponent's side of the bar and ethnic group. One of the mediators,
Tony Fitzgerald, was a certified mediator in a court program, so he probably had
mediation training and experience. I assume from his behavior, that the other
mediator, Stanley Jacobs, had no background as a mediator, and this produced a
major problem.
B. Mediating
By the time of .this mediation, Koskoff was well aware that Tony "craved ac-
countability," i.e., to know what caused the injuries to his children, and Koskoff
realized that a mediation could not provide it. Koskoff still worried about Tony's
conduct in the mediation. When Donna and Tony insisted on attending, however,
he agreed, but on the condition that they promised to hold "their questions until
the end."49
Because Tony and Donna were present, the second mediation shows, more
dramatically than the first, the disparity between Tony and Donna's perception of
the problem-definition and the perception of the lawyers.5 ° On one level, it also
validated Koskoff's concern. The Sabias were overwhelmed by listening to
Koskoff's and Doyle's presentations. And well before the end of the mediation,
Tony exploded, as Koskoff had feared, partly because he thought Doyle had "no
47. Id. at 340-44, 356-65, 370.
48. Id. at 341.
49. Id. at 357.
50. See supra Figures 1 and 2. See also supra Part II.D. 1.
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clue" about what he had been through.5' In doing so, he expressed or acted out his
real needs. In Werth's words:
The world had no idea how he and Donna and Little Tony had suffered,
and that ignorance itself was the larger crime, even more than whatever
had been done to them in the first place. He wanted Doyle to acknowl-
edge that the hospital was at fault for killing Michael and devastating Lit-
tle Tony and making him and Donna wrecks. He wanted Travelers to
pay, dearly. But what he seemed to want even more was a formal recog-
nition of what his family had been put through, how violated and alone
they were, and what it had taken for them to survive. He wanted Doyle
and Casey [Brian Casey, Travelers' Vice President for Medical Liability]
to concede that he, Tony, had withstood all the mental abuse the world
could throw at him and was still standing.
He wanted respect.
52
He did not get it, however. Immediately after Tony's statement, Fitzgerald
"threw everybody out" because he wanted to talk to Jacobs about what he consid-
ered "the key issue"--causation. Plainly that would have been the key issue at
trial and therefore it has an important place in the mediation. Many mediators,
however, would have tried to attend to Tony's emotional needs. Mediators who
take a "transformative" approach, for instance, see "recognition" as one of the two
most significant elements of mediation, the other being empowerment; they view
settlement as a secondary goal. 54 And, the "understanding-based" approach to
mediation would have placed Tony and Donna's emotional needs front and center
and seen them as an essential component of the leaming required to truly resolve
this case, rather than simply settle it.
55
Many more traditional mediators also would have responded to these needs.
Virtually any book on mediation and nearly any mediation training program
would say that, at a minimum, the mediator should have used "active listening,"
i.e., paraphrased the content and named the emotions connected with Tony's out-
burst. This could have given Tony at least some of the acknowledgment he
sought and made it easier for the defense team to really hear or understand what
Tony was saying. In addition, a mediator could have given such recognition to
Tony and Donna in private caucus and, in private caucuses with the defense, made
certain that they were aware of this need and asked them to consider responding to
it. Any mediator who was open to a "broad" perspective would have at least
raised this as an issue and done what seemed appropriate and feasible in the cir-
cumstances. Because we do not have a verbatim record of the mediation, we can-
not be sure the mediators did not do any of this, but the book gives no hint of it.
51. WERTH, supra note 1, at 359.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 360.
54. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 84-99. To what extent did Donna and Tony feel "empow-
ered" by or during either mediation? Would "transformative" mediation have made sense here?
55. See Saving the Last Dance, supra note 39. For an explanation of the difference between settle-
ment and resolution, see infra note 70.
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In the mediators' private session, Jacobs told Fitzgerald, in Werth's words,
that "the case might net $7.5 million at trial," and suggested that, accordingly, $5
million was a good settlement figure.56 There were other ways to present an
evaluation, of course. 57 One obvious method was to have given a range of possi-
ble outcomes and attached probabilities to each. Would that have been more real-
istic? More helpful? A recent conversation I had with an active mediator in a big
city bears on this question. This mediator had been a lawyer, then served as a
judge in his state's trial court, intermediate appellate court, and supreme court. He
said that, notwithstanding all that experience, he did not feel competent to predict
a specific court outcome.
Of course, the book does not say that Fitzgerald or Jacobs told the partici-
pants that Jacobs predicted a $7.5 million court outcome. I suspect, however, that
they did so, in order to justify the proposed settlement of $5 million. (Both sides
needed a rationale with which they could feel comfortable.)
As the mediation progressed, Jacobs' behavior undermined Fitzgerald's me-
diation attempts. In general, a mediator is charged with assuming an impartial or
neutral role, which, to some commentators, seems inconsistent with the evaluative
responsibilities with which Jacobs was charged. Moreover, Jacobs went beyond
the normal evaluative role and, in a private caucus, actually supported Doyle's
argument and position, which seemed to increase Doyle's intransigence.58 This
plainly impaired Fitzgerald's attempts at shaking the defense team's confidence in
order to get them to see the wisdom of a $5 million settlement.5 9 Fitzgerald also
tried to shake confidence on the plaintiffs' side, and Werth suggests that Jacobs
also undermined that effort.6 ° It seems clear that Jacobs, though apparently a
highly capable plaintiffs' lawyer, did not understand the mediator role.6' Assum-
ing that there was potential benefit in getting the kind of evaluation of the court
outcome that Jacobs provided, could he have contributed to the process without
trying to help mediate? Although the practice was not common in 1993, today, it
would not be unusual to agree in a mediation to have an evaluation prepared in
order to facilitate the negotiations.
In retrospect, was it wise for Fitzgerald to push for the $5 million settlement
and continue to ask the parties, privately, if they could "get there"? Although the
book is not clear on this point, it seems that Fitzgerald may have asked the law-
yers for their "bottom line" figures,62 so that he could have a sense of whether it
was possible for them to eventually agree to his proposed settlement figure. As-
56. WERTH, supra note 1, at 360.
57. See supra Part Ill.D.2.c. 1.
58. WERTH, supra note 1, at 36 1.
59. This might partially explain why only Fitzgerald was involved in the telephonic mediation that
followed the formal mediation sessions. According to Werth's account, Jacobs' only potentially useful
contribution was to provide an evaluation. Id. at 360. Most mediators would say that co-mediation can
be far superior to solo mediation, but only if the mediators can work well together.
60. Id. at 363.
61. For a famous recent example of a person with a brilliant legal mind who "mediated" an impor-
tant case but seemed to know little of basic principles of mediation, see Ken Auletta, Final Offer:
What Kept Microsoft from Settling Its Case?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2001, at 40 (describing Judge
Richard Posner's mediation of the antitrust cases against Microsoft).
62. 1 am guessing that this is what Werth and Ferguson meant by "real numbers." WERTH, supra
note 1, at 360.
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suming he did ask the lawyers for such a figure, was it a good technique? Many
mediators scrupulously avoid asking for the parties' bottom lines. Why?
Many times a negotiator's bottom line changes with the circumstances, with
what they learn in the mediation, and with their moods. Such a bottom line often
is based on limited settlement authority that negotiators receive from their superi-
ors; and it is fairly common for negotiators to call their superiors for additional
authority. Some mediators would avoid asking for a bottom line out of fear that
the negotiator who answers this question may in some sense feel committed to the
figure she gives. On the other hand, it is common practice for negotiators to tell
the mediator, sometimes without the mediator's asking, a "final, final" figure-
and then depart from it later. Sometimes, however, when negotiators claim to be
giving their final figure, they mean it.
As the mediation proceeded, Koskoff reduced his demand from $13 million
to $8.5 million, and privately told Fitzgerald he would come down to $7.5 million.
Doyle raised his offer from $2.5 million to $3.5 million, leaving a $5 million offi-
cial gap and a $4 million unofficial gap.
What ultimately stopped the parties from reaching an agreement during the
face-to-face mediation? After the defense team walked out, Fitzgerald told the
plaintiffs' side about a previously unreported offer that had a value of $5.15 mil-
lion.63 In Werth's words, Koskoff replied that it was "too little, too late."64 Why
was this too little, given that Donna and Tony had just struggled with accepting a
$3.5 million offer? And why was it too late? We read that Koskoff had been
"offended" by the $3.5 million offer. And just before he walked out, Doyle felt
and expressed great anger at Koskoff for not "moving" enough and for not giving
Doyle the kind of justification he thought he needed to request a larger payment
from Travelers. Apparently he and his colleagues from Travelers left in anger,
without saying goodbye to anyone on the plaintiffs' side. Werth says that "a mix-
ture of pride and spite and greed" prevented the settlement.65 Do you agree? Was
Werth referring to the lawyers, or the clients, or both? To what extent should
lawyers' emotions or ego-needs play a role in determining whether a settlement
will take place?
Despite this inauspicious ending to the formal co-mediation, the mediation re-
sumed by telephone, with just one mediator, Fitzgerald, and led to a settlement. It
is quite common for mediations to continue by telephone after the in-person ses-
sions have ended without a settlement. It also is quite common for a case to settle
shortly after mediation through negotiation between the lawyers. Often, time is
essential for the lawyers and the parties to digest what they learned in the media-
tion and to incorporate it into their understanding of the case.
C. Discussion Questions for the Second Mediation
1. What kept the mediators and the lawyers in this mediation, as in the first
one, from trying to do something about Tony and Donna's deep need for recogni-
tion? Was it that they adopted the same, very narrow problem-definition that
63. Id. at 363.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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dominated the pretrial process and the first mediation? 66 If so, did they not con-
sider that attending to Tony and Donna's needs for recognition might make it
easier to settle the case? If not, why?
2. Ironically, Doyle probably had a better basis for understanding Tony and
Donna's experience than most people. Doyle "had grown up in a household like
[theirs], with a crippled birth-injured child, neglected siblings, and a hard-bitten
father and suffering mother struggling against defeat." 67 But Donna and Tony did
not know this. What do you suppose kept Doyle from telling them or from other-
wise responding to Tony's plea for recognition? What about Casey of Travelers?
We learn that he was a single father and admired Tony. Why didn't he say so?
Would that have given Tony some of the recognition he needed and helped him
reach an emotional resolution? Could it potentially have hurt Casey or Travelers?
Do you think that Doyle or Caseyfelt empathy or sympathy for the Sabia family?
If not, why not? If so, do you think they paid any psychic price for not expressing
those feelings? Recent scholarship has focused on the importance of empathy and
apology in resolving disputes. 68
3. Could Koskoff have done anything to head off Tony's outburst that would
have allowed Tony to express his emotional needs? What if Koskoff had helped
him prepare an opening statement, as Tom Arnold recommends, and as is com-
mon in mediations today?
69
D. Dimensions of Conflict Resolution
Bernard Mayer writes that it is helpful to view conflict, and conflict resolu-
tion, as taking place along three dimensions-behavioral, cognitive, and emo-
tional-and that real resolution includes all three dimensions. 70 Behavioral reso-
lution means that the parties stop contesting; cognitive resolution means that the
parties felt comfortable with a rationale that supports their decision to stop con-
testing, e.g., that they thought they had reached an appropriate settlement; and
emotional resolution means that they were emotionally at peace about the matter,
i.e., no longer investing emotional energy in the dispute. Which of these goals did
each of the participants have in mind? Which did they achieve? Which were
possible to achieve?
Obviously, all concerned achieved a behavioral resolution. And it is likely
that most reached a cognitive resolution, developing an intellectual comfort that
comes from accepting a rationale that justifies accepting the settlement agreement.
But what about emotional resolution? It appears that Koskoff and Doyle must
66. See Guthrie, Philosophical Map, supra note 33 (arguing that lawyers' dominating personalities
and mindsets may interfere with their ability to deploy certain mediation strategies and techniques).
67. WERTH, supra note 1, at 359.
68. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999);
Jennifer Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
69. Arnold, supra note 12, at 69.
70. See BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
(2000). See also J. Michael Keating, Jr. & Margaret L. Shaw, Compared to What?: Defining Terms in
Court-Related ADR Programs, 6 NEGOT. J. 217 (1990) (suggesting that "settlement" typifies judi-
cially-hosted settlement conferences, but that "collaboration" or "resolution" should be the goal in
mediation).
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have reached psychological comfort-and cognitive resolution-based on the idea
that they did as well as they could have, under the circumstances. But that was
not true for all the lawyers involved. To Beverly Hunt, the associate lawyer who
worked for Doyle and his predecessor in representing Norwalk Hospital, "the
settlement was a lie, invalidating everything she believed in. Unlike Doyle, she'd
been unable to put her identification with the hospital aside, and the mediations
had proved unsupportable-'the most castrating experience of my life."'
71
The mediation processes did not provide Tony and Donna the kind of recog-
nition they needed for emotional resolution. (And Donna also felt shut out of the
final decision-making during the mediation).72 Ironically, they seemed to have
gained that recognition, and I suspect, the emotional resolution it could help pro-
duce, through publication of Barry Werth's Damages. I hope that the publication
of this Symposium and other writings about their case will provide similar bene-
fits. But, I wonder whether some of the other participants in the evolution of this
case, such as Maryellen Humes, M.D., and Molly Fortuna, the nurse-midwife, also
might have achieved some aspects of resolution by participating in such proc-
esses.
73
V. CONCLUSION
Teaching about mediation from Damages has been a great joy for several rea-
sons. First, the book contains lucid, engaging, detailed descriptions of the media-
tions from the perspective of a disinterested third party who-unlike many "ex-
perts"-began with no particular expectations or beliefs about what mediation is
or should be. Second, the rest of the book helps provide a detailed context in
which to understand the mediations and the people involved-their personalities,
situations, and aspirations. Such information about mediations is rarely available,
largely because of the confidentiality normally associated with mediation. For
these reasons, Damages is a treasure for teachers and students of mediation, as
well as for those who study negotiation and, as this Symposium shows, a wide
variety of other topics.
In this brief essay, I have touched on only a few aspects of the mediations. I
hope that others will explore these rich descriptions more deeply and widely; they
will bear much more study.
71. WERTH, supra note 1, at 369.
72. Id. at 367.
73. See Ann J. Kellett, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in Debates
between Physicians and Patients, 1987 Mo. J. DisP. RESOL. 111 (1987) (discussing the promise of
mediation in medical malpractice claims).
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